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rew owledge 
Accident and incident reports have indicated that flight attendants have numerous 
ipportunities to provide the flight-deck crew with operational information that may prevent or 
essen the severity of a potential problem. Additionally, as carrier fleets transition from three 
ierson to two person flight-deck crews, the reliance upon the cabin crew for the transfer of this 
nformation may increase further. Recent research (Chute & Wiener, 1996) indicates that 
light attendants do not feel confident in their ability to describe mechanical parts or 
nalfunctions of the aircraft, and the lack of flight attendant technical training has been 
eferenced in a number of recent reports (National Transportation Safety Board, 1992; 
kinsportation Safety Board of Canada, 1995; Chute & Wiener, 1996). 
h e  present study explored both flight attendant technical knowledge and flight attendant and 
do t  expectations of flight attendant technical knowledge. To assess the technical knowledge 
if cabin crewmembers, 177 current flight attendants from two U. S. carriers voluntarily 
:ompleted a 13-item technical quiz. To investigate expectations of flight attendant technical 
mowledge, 18 1 pilots and a second sample of 96 flight attendants, from the same two airlines, 
:ompleted surveys designed to capture each group's expectations of operational knowledge 
equired of flight attendants. 
Analyses revealed several discrepancies between the present level of flight attendant 
iperational knowledge and pilots' and flight attendants' expected and desired levels of 
xxhnical knowledge. Implications for training will be discussed. 
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Accident and incident reports have indicated that flight attendants have numerous opportunities to 
provide the flight-deck crew with operational information that may prevent or lessen the severity of 
a potential problem. Additionally, as carrier fleets transition from three to two person flight-deck 
crews, the reliance upon the cabin crew for the transfer of such information may increase further. 
Recent research indicates that flight attendants do not feel confident in their ability to describe 
mechanical parts or malfunctions of the aircraft. Additionally, this lack of flight attendant technical 
training has been referenced in a number of recent reports. The present study explored both flight 
attendant technical knowledge and flight attendaut and pilot expectations of flight attendant 
technical knowledge. Results suggest that cabin crews are not receiving the amount of technical 
training that both pilots and cabin crew members believe is necessary for the efficient exchange of 
safety infomation. Implications for training are discussed. 
Evaluation of Cabin Crew Technical Knowledge 
On July 19,1989, a United Airlines DC-10 experienced an uncontained failure of the 
number two engine during cruise flight which resulted in the loss of all the aircraft‘s hydraulic 
systems. Thereafter, the aircraEt was flown by manipulation of the power controls for the two 
engines that remained functional. During this time, a flight attendant reported to the flight crew that 
there was damage to the “back wing” (National Transportation Safety Board, 1989). The second 
officer proceeded to the cabin and looked at the wings, but the damage was actually to the 
horizontal stabilizer rather than a wing. While in this example of the Sioux City accident, there 
was sufficient time and personnel available to assess the accuracy of the flight attendant’s report, 
the implications of an inadequate command of aircraft tenninology and mechanical knowledge by 
flight attendants are potentially serious (National Transportation Safety Board, 1989). 
The 1989 Kegworth accident provides an example of what can result under circumstances where 
the cabin crew might have provided critical information which the flight-deck crew could not have gathered 
themselves. Leading to the Kegworth crash, a British Midlands Boeing 737-400 experienced an engine 
fire about 13 minutes after taking off from Heathrow Airport. The pilots reduced power to the right 
engine, which diminished the vibration in the aircraft, and led them to the conclusion that the problem was 
with the right engine. The flight-deck crew then proceeded to shutdown the right engine. W e  this 
decision making ww taking place in the cockpit, flight attendants and passengers could see flames 
shooting from the left engine. Yet even after a flight-deck announcement to the passengers that there had 
been trouble with the right engine, which had now been shut down, none of the flight attendants reported 
the discrepancy or their concerns to the cockpit. 
Recently, several factors have emerged which compel a closer examination of the interface 
between the cabin and cockpit crews, and the facilitation of the transfer of technical i2formation 
specifically. First, automation has led to the proliferation of 2-pilot aircraft. As the position of the 
flight engineer has been replaced by advanced technology, the flight crew has also lost the trained 
eyes and ears of an intermediary to information beyond the cockpit door. Responsibility for 
detecting anomalies in proximity to the cabin which are outside the capabilities of the automated 
systems and for accurately relaying that information to the pilots now falls to the cabin crew. 
Second, flight attendants have not been trained to be technically aware nor articulate in 
order to facilitate effective information transfer. Chute and Wiener (1996) report that when flight 
attendants were asked to describe their confidence in their ability to describe mechanical parts or 
malfunctions of the aircraft, almost 60% responded “moderately” or less. These results are not 
surprising when one considers that the FAA flight attendaut initial and transition ground training 
requirements (FAR 121.421) only specify that the flight attendant be aware of the physical 
characteristics of the aircraft that may have a bearing on responsibilities such as ditching, 
evacuation, and inflight emergency procedures and on other related duties. Examples of the 
required topics are: The use of the public address system, electrical galley equipment, and the 
controls for cabin heat and ventilation. Presently, most training curricula incorporate only these 
topics. 
And third, research has shown that effective communication between the cockpit and cabin 
is hampered by barriers which exist between the two crews (Chute & Wiener, 1995). Not only are 
the flight attendants nonconversant in technical knowledge, but their input is not cultivated as a 
source of information. 
The lack of flight attendant technical training has been referenced in a number of recent 
reports (National Transportation Safety Board, 1992; Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 
1995; Chute & Wiener, 1996). As we saw with the Sioux City accident, valuable time could be 
lost if information is not conveyed in a timely and accurate manner. Conversely, if the cabin crews 
have a working knowledge of aircraft systems and terminology, .information transfer can be 
facilitated. 
The purpose of this study was to measure the technical knowledge currently possessed by 
cabin crew members, as well as to explore the level of technical knowledge both flight-deck and 
cabin crew members expect flight attendants to maintain. 
Method 
PartiCiDants 
In order to examine technical knowledge, flight attendants from two United States airlines 
voluntarily completed questionnaires. These participants included 122 female and 55 male current 
flight attendants ranging in age from 22 to 75 (r/I=39, ==8.40). The average number of years as 
a flight attendant was 12 (SD=8.49). Ninety-one percent of the flight attendants had some college 
experience and 41% were college graduates. The average number of months since their last 
recurrent training class was five (SD=3.81). Only 16% of the flight attendants had any kind of 
pilot instruction and only three had their private pilot license. 
To investigate expectations of flight attendant technical knowledge, pilots and a second 
sample of flight attendants from the same two airlines completed a second set of surveys. Flight 
attendant volunteers included 78 females and 18 males, with the average age of the participants 
being 39 years (sD=8.40), ranging from 25 to 64 years of age. The mean number of years as a 
flight attendant was 14.09 (SD=8.35). Eighteen percent of the flight attendant volunteers for this 
survey had some piloting experience, which ranged from ground school to a private pilot license. 
One hundred eighty-one pilots participated in the study. All but one of the pilots were male. One 
hundred six volunteers were captains, 56 were first officers, and 19 were second officers. The 
average number of years as a pilot was 18.96 (sD=8.61) and the mean age of the pilot group was 
48 years a=7.65) ,  ranging from 32 to 73 years. 
Materials 
Flight attendant technical knowledge was measured using a 13-item questionnaire 
consisting of questions addressing basic aerodynamics, aircraft systems and components, and 
procedural issues. Both cockpit and cabin crew members’ expectations of flight attendant 
operational knowledge were assessed using a 13-item survey consisting of a series of ten skill 
areas and three short fill-in questions. Volunteers were asked to rate each skill area, on a five-point 
scale, as to their expectation about how knowledgeable a flight attendant would be in the given 
area. Confidentiality of the participants was guaranteed through the anonymity of the 
questionnaires . 
Procedure 
Technical auestionnaire. Upon the approval of both flight attendant union and 
management, flight attendants were recruited from their company briefing area and asked to 
volunteer 15 minutes of their time to complete the technical questionnaire. Flight attendants who 
chose to participatein the study were then given written instructions and a copy of the 
questionnaire. Participants completed the questionnaire and returned it directly to the researcher. 
Flight attendant and pilot exetation survev. Survey packets were randomly distributed to 
a sample of flight attendants and pilots in their company mailbox. Each packet consisted of an 
informed consent letter, a copy of the survey, and a stamped, addressed return envelope. 
Participants completed the survey and returned it directly to the researcher in the envelope that was 
provided. Flight attendant volunteers who completed the technical questionnaire were asked not to 
participate in the training topics survey. A total of 600 surveys were distributed to each group, 
with a 30% return rate for pilots and 16% for night attendants. 
Results and Discussion 
Because the potential differences between the two airlines were beyond the scope of this 
study and the use ottwo airlines was intended solely to increase the sample size, all data were 
collapsed across airlines. The study consisted of two main parts, night attendant technical 
knowledge and flight attendant and pilot expectations of flight attendant technical knowledge. 
Analyses were performed on the data from each of these groups and are presented below. 
Technical auestionnaire 
The techcal survey included ten multiple choice items examining flight attendants’ 
knowledge of aircraft systems and procedures and a question on the theory of flight. Frequencies 
of correct answers were calculated for each question and the results are provided in Figure 1. 
Sterile cockpit. Analyses of the technical survey revealed several areas where flight 
attendant training programs may be inadequate. One of the most important issues is that of the 
“sterile cockpit.” Chute and Wiener (1996) have addressed concerns about the application of 
sterile cockpit regulations to the cabin and of the confusion cabin crew members seem to have in 
the interpretation of the regulation. The FAA regulation of “sterile cockpit” states that no flight 
crew member shall perform any duties during a critical phase of flight except those duties required 
for the safe operation of the aircraft, and furthermore, that no flight crew member may engage in 
any activity during a critical phase of flight which could distract a crew member or interfere in any 
way with the proper conduct of the flight (FAR 121.542). Recent research (Chute, 1994) 
describes the hesitancy of cabin crew members to intempt sterile cockpit and the need for 
clarification of this regulation. The present study confirmed that the understanding of sterile 
cockpit rules remains unclear. When given the scenario, “You are sitting at an exit door. One 
minute after takeoff you hear an UNUSUAL whistling sound that appears to be located near the 
door. As lead flight attendant what action would you take?’ only 50% of the subjects would call 
the flight deck immediately and 3% either would not call at all or did not know what to do. Less 
than half of the volunteer flight attendants stated that they would pass forward information about 
the exit door’s unusual whistling sound, regardless of sterile cockpit. This result is of particular 
significance since a similar situation, on an ATR 72, resulted in the separation of the rear cabin 
door during takeoff, at approximately 800 feet AGL (National Transportation Safety Board, 
1995a). The lead flight attendant reported hearing a very loud humming noise coming from the 
door after takeoff and that the noise was unlike anythmg she had ever heard in the past. However; 
she did not use the interphone to contact either the ##2 fight attendant or the cockpit crew regarding 
the noise. In an interview with an NTSB investigator, when asked under what conditions would 
she consider calling the cockpit during the sterile cockpit phase, the flight attendant responded that 
she, ‘Would call the cockpit if there was an emergency such as a fKe or a problem passenger 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1995b)”. Responses to the sterile cockpit question indicate 
that the sterile cockpit regulation continues to be a point of confusion for fight attendants regarding 
appropriate reasons for the interruption of the sterile cockpit. 
Fire detection. Smoke detection is another important area where knowledge can prevent or 
lessen a dangerous situation. An understanding of smoke and fie detection could be helpful in 
identifying the source of a fire and in leading to a more expeditious solution. Additionally, 
knowledge of characteristics of types of smoke may help the cabin crew communicate reports of 
smoke or fife to the flightdeck more clearly and effectively. Flight attendants who participated in 
the technical survey were not aware that there are differences between the look and smell of smoke 
from an electrical system fire versus that of the smoke from a heatingkooling system fire. Twenty 
percent of the flight attendants did not think there was any difference between the two types of 
smoke and 24% answered that they did not know whether there was a difference or not. 
APU torching. Torching on auxiliary power unit (AFW) start tip was also addressed. Only 
52% of the participants were aware that this is a common Occurrence on some aircraft types, and is 
a self-contained engine fxe and is not a problem. There have been numerous Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) reports of passenger-initiated evacuations that were the result of 
passengers seeing a sudden flash of fire during APU start up. Familiarity with the APU may 
provide flight attendants with the knowledge to relieve the concerns of passengers and deter 
ensuing unnecessary evacuations. Eight percent believed that torching on APU start up was an 
emergency situation and approximately 19% could not answer the question. 
Theory of flight. The question regarding the theory of flight prwed to be one of the most 
difficult. Only 29% of participating flight attendants knew that the four counterbalancing forces are 
lift, weight, thrust, and drag. 
Aircraft Svstems and Procedures. When examining flight attendants’ knowledge of aircraft 
systems and procedures, over 86% of participants knew that the hydraulic system provides the 
p’wer (force) needed to move the ailerons, elevators, and rudders of the large aircraft. Eighty-t :yo 
percent were aware that snow build-up, as well as icing, can be a problem. Another question 
assessed whether the flight attegiants know where fire detection systems may be located. Only 
72% of the participants knew that fire detection systems can be located in the engines, cargo 
compartment, as well as the main gear wheel wells and 16.4% did not know of any location. 
Aircraft components. Still another area of flight attendant technical training which falls 
short is that of knowledge of the aircraft itself. Only 11% of the flight attendants were able to 
correctly match the labels of eight basic aircraft components on a diagram. These components 
included such parts as the vertical and horizontal stabilizers, the trailing-edge flaps, the spoilers, 
and the rudder. A breakdown of responses for each component is shown in Figure 2. 
Additionally, 83% of participants did not know that aircraft engines are numbered from left to 
right. Ninety-five percent of the flight attendants correctly labeled the right and left sides of the 
aircraft, which can be a point of confusion as flight attendant duties and jumpseats often require 
them to face the opposite direction of reference. A basic knowledge of these aircraft parts can not 
only help the cabin crew more clearly describe concerns to the flight deck, but may also help flight 
attendants understand information that they receive from the flightdeck. 
Overall Scores. Percentage of total correct responses was calculated to determine an overall 
score on the technical questionnaire a=61%,  ==16%). To examine whether number of years as 
a flight attendant and number of months since last recurrent training class influence the overall 
score, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated. Results indicated no si@icant 
relationship between overall score on the technical questionnaire and time as a flight attendant, and 
overall score and time since recurrent training 0 =.15, e = .06; = -.03, g = .70, respectively). 
Previous piloting experience is another variable which could have influenced the overall 
score on the technical questionnaire. As noted earlier, 16% of flight attendant participants had 
some previous piloting experience. In order to assess the influence of this variable, a two (pilot 
experience) by thirteen (subject area) mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted 
on scores on the technical questionnaire. Pilot experience was a between subjects factor. Results 
revealed a subject areaby pilot experience interaction @12,2100) = 17.86, e -001). The pattern 
of the means indicates that flight attendants who had some piloting experience scored better in 
some subject areas than did those flight attendants without piloting experience. 
In order to examine the interaction further, several one-way ANOVAs were conducted. 
Results of the analyses revealed a significant difference between flight attendants with piloting 
experience and those without, in the areas of basic aerodynamics (&1,175) = 13.89, g e .OOl), fire 
detection systems (&1,175) = 5.13, g e .05), and labeling of aircraft components (&1,175) = 15.52, 
g e .OOl). As shown in Figure 3, the pattern of means illustrate that for each of these three items, 
flight attendants with piloting experience scored higher than those without piloting experience. 
Expectations of Night Attendant Technical Knowledge 
Ratings of knowledye expectation. Pilots and a different sample of flight attendants were 
asked to rate, on a five-point scale (knot at all knowledgeable to 5=very knowledgeable), a series 
of operation4 skill areas according to their expectation that a flight attendant would be 
knowledgeable in that given area. Expectations of flight attendant knowledge varied across topics. 
Both pilots and flight attendants expected flight attendant knowledge to be highest regarding safety 
procedures and sterile cockpit rules and lowest in the more technical areas of basic aerodynamics 
and function of aircraft components. 
.A two (job position) by ten (skill area) mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted on expectations of flight attendant technical knowledge. Results revealed a skill area by 
position interaction a(9,2430) = 9.63, g < .001). The pattern of the means, presented in Figure 
4, indicates that pilots and flight attendants had similar expectations for many skill areas, but 
different expectations for others. 
In order to examine the interaction further, several one-way ANOVAs were conducted. 
Results of the analyses revealed a significant difference between pilot and flight attendant 
expectations of flight attendant knowledge in the areas of basic aerodynamics E( 1,275) = 1 1.91, g 
< .Ol), aircraft systems (F(1,275) = 10.80, c .Ol), sterile cockpit @(1,275) = 22.28, g e .Ol), 
and crew resource management (CRM) @(1,273) = 12.37, E e .Ol), with flight attendants having 
higher expectations of knowledge than pilots in all cases except CRM. 
Need for flight attendant technical knowledpe. Pilot and flight attendant volunteers were 
asked to list 5 subject areas that they thought should be part of flight attendant training. The five 
most frequently given responses to this question are shown in Figure 5. Thirty-seven percent of 
pilots and 40% of flight attendants included flight attendant technical training as one of the five 
most important training needs. Additionally, pilots and flight attendants stated that they do not 
believe that flight attendants are receiving the amount of technical knowledge necessary for the 
efficient exchange of safety information. Sixty-seven percent of pilots and 59% of flight attendants 
found this type of training lacking. One pilot summed up his thoughts with, “When a flight 
attendant tells me that the “thingy” on the “whatsit” is loose, I know there’s not enough technical 
training,’’ and a flight attendant concurred, “The only time we learn about mechanical problems on 
the aircraft is when they occur. We should have at least one day of training to include information 
on turbulence, theory of flight, and basic operations of the aircraft.” Both incidents and accidents 
demonstrate that cabin crew members have numerous opportunities to provide valuable safety 
infomation to the flightdeck. In the present survey, 62% of pilots responded that they have 
received important safety information concerning the aircraft (aside from cabin equipment), from a 
flight attendant and 69% of the flight attendants reported providing the flight-deck crew with that 
safety information. For example, one pilot reported, “A flight attendant came to the flightdeck to 
pass on information that an engine was loose and hanging from the wing. We were not aware 
because all indications were normal.” Another reported, “In Moscow - taxiing for takeoff to New 
York. Maximum gross takeoff weight. A flight attendant called us while taxiing and reported a 
popping noise ‘under the aircraft at the wings.’ It was a blown tire. We (pilots) had no idea it was 
blown.” 5 
Conclusions 
The present study reports several important findings. First, the results indicate that flight 
attendants do not evidence a great deal of technical knowledge in the areas sampled by the technical 
survey. Despite this result, the responses to the open-ended questions on the second instrument 
indicated that there are many instances where flight attendauts have the potential to provide 
technical information to the flightdeck crew. Second, both flight attendant and pilot expectations 
of flight attendant technical knowledge overall were low, with only half of the topic areas receiving 
a rating of 3.5 or better. Third, flight attendant technical knowledge does not appear to be acquired 
while on the line. 
garding pilot and flight attendant expectations, it may be that since flight attendant 
training curricula rarely include the technical issues studied here, the low expectations described 
above may reflect the level of knowledge to which pilots and flight attendants have become 
accustomed. This conclusion is also indicated by the fact that some of the specific skill areas, such 
as basic aerodynamics and sterile cockpit, where flight attendants had difficulty on the technical 
survey, were also areas in which pilots expected even less howledge than did flight attendants. 
These low expectations may have an impact on the communication process. If the pilots do not 
expect reliable information from the flight attendants, they may be more skeptical about the 
information they do receive and mofe hesitant to utilize cabin crew members as a source of 
information. Likewise, if flight attendants are not comfortable with their flying partners’ technical 
knowledge, or even their own, they may be less willing to pass information forward to the flight- 
deck crew. 
Finally, the results of the study also suggest that flight attendants are not picking up this 
technical knowledge while on the line, evidenced by the fact that overall knowledge was not 
significantly related to number of years as a flight attendant. Both initial and recurrent flight 
attendant training could promote a better understanding of aerodynamics, aircraft systems, and 
basic components of the aircraft, so the knowledge is maintained over time and new issues 
addressed. Proviag a common technical language for the cabin and cockpit crews is only a 
starting point. Given the continuing confusion over the sterile cockpit regulation, an emphasis 
must be made in training as to the importance of passing information up to the cockpit to let the 
pilots decide its relevance or importance. If the information never gets passed between the crews, 
it is of little value. Recently, the FAA ruled on a new training requirement for flight attendants 
under part 121 and part 135 operations (Federal Aviation Administration, 1996). The regulation 
requires both initial and recurrent flight attendant training curriculum to include crew resource 
management (CRM) training. This new curriculum ruling can be a good opportunity for airlines to 
address technical issues. 
In addition to training, jumpseat experience would give flight attendants an idea of 
pes of information to which the pilots do not have access, as well as demonstrating standard 
flight operations and pilot workload. While some airlines have begun to allow cockpit jumpseat or 
simulator rides for flight attendants, this practice could be expanded. 
While no one expects flight attendants to attain the level of technical knowledge that pilots 
possess, improvements can be made to raise the current level of flight attendant technical 
knowledge in order for cabin and cockpit crew members to be able to communicate safety 
information more clearly, quickly, and effectively. Finally, future research should examine further 
the complex elements of inter-pup processes in effective communication within the context of 
airline operations and their implications for flight safety. 
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Figure Captions 
Firmre 1. Frequency of flight attendant’s correct answers on multiple choice items. 
Figure 2. Frequency of correct answers on diagram of aircraft components. 
Figure 3. Average frequency of correct answers for subject areas where flight attendants with 
previous piloting experience scored significantly better than flight attendants without piloting 
experience. 
Figure 4. Average ratings of flight attendant and pilot expectations of technical knowledge.. 
Note: A rating of five is defined as the expectation that a flight attendant would be very 
knowledgeable in the given area, and a rating of one, as the expectation that a flight attendant 
would be not at all knowledgeable in that specific area. 
Figure 5. Five most frequently given subject areas that flight attendants and pilots believe should 
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